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The Deadweight Loss of Christmas: Comment
By BRADLEY J. RUFFLE

AND

Two previous surveys used to measure the
welfare implications of Christmas gift-giving in
the United States have reached opposite conclusions. Joel Waldfogel (1993) finds a welfare
reduction of 13 percent or more associated with
Christmas giving. Curiously, Sara J. Solnick
and David Hemenway’s (1996) (henceforth,
SH) replication of Waldfogel’s survey turns up
just the opposite result: a 214-percent welfare
gain. We design a series of controlled laboratory experiments to determine why the two papers arrive at opposite conclusions. We do not
produce our own estimate of the deadweight
loss of gift-giving; rather, our aim is to understand how, and which among, the differences in
methodology between the two studies account
for their divergent findings.
Waldfogel (1993) surveyed 58 students enrolled in an intermediate microeconomics class
about specific gifts they had received for Christmas. He asked recipients to estimate the amount
paid by the giver for each gift received. Recipients were then asked to place a value on each
gift they received. Respondents were instructed
to estimate the value of a gift as the “...amount
of cash such that you are indifferent between the
gift and the cash, not counting the sentimental
value of the gift” (p. 1331). Waldfogel measures
the welfare yield of a gift as the difference
between the recipient’s valuation and her cost
estimate of the gift. Based on 278 gifts reported,
Waldfogel finds that gifts have an average yield
of 87.1 percent, indicating that gifts lose about
13 percent of their value in the exchange from
giver to receiver. When cash gifts are excluded,
the average yield falls further to 83.9 percent.

ORIT TYKOCINSKI*

SH were intrigued enough by Waldfogel’s
results to replicate his study. Contrary to Waldfogel, SH find that gift-giving is actually welfare improving with an average yield of 214
percent (median yield 111 percent). They claim
that a broader subject pool than that questioned
by Waldfogel explains the reversal. Concerned
that undergraduates in an intermediate microeconomics class may be unrepresentative, SH
administered their survey to members of the
general public at train stations and airports and
to staff and graduate students enrolled in a biostatistics or an economics class at the Harvard
School of Public Health. They also altered the
question used to elicit respondents’ valuations
of gifts received. Their survey question reads as
follows (p. 1300): “Aside from any sentimental
value, if, without the giver ever knowing, you
could receive an amount of money instead of
the gift, what is the minimum amount of money
that would make you equally happy?” The
change in wording from “the amount of cash
such that you are indifferent” to the “amount of
money that would make you equally happy”
was prompted by a concern that “indifference”
is a technical word familiar only to economists.
It remains to be seen whether SH’s “equally
happy” question is substantially equivalent to
the “indifference” version of the question or
whether they have introduced a greater change
than they realize.
An additional methodological concern is that
the cost estimates always precede respondents’
valuations in both studies. Order effects are well
documented in the social psychology literature:1
cost estimates may influence valuations. In particular, costs may serve as a judgmental anchor
upon which to base value estimates. Reversing
the order of the questions is a technique common to survey and experimental methods in the
social sciences to balance the researcher’s design and offset possible order effects.

* Ruffle: Department of Economics, Ben Gurion University, P.O.B. 653, Beer Sheva, 84105, Israel (e-mail:
bradley@bgumail.bgu.ac.il); Tykocinski: Department of
Behavioral Sciences, Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheva,
84105, Israel (e-mail: oritt@bgumail.bgu.ac.il). We thank
Tomer Bakalash for research assistance and Sara Solnick,
Todd Kaplan, three anonymous referees of this journal, and
seminar participants at Ben Gurion University, Universite
Louis Pasteur, and the 1998 ESA meetings in Mannheim for
comments.

1
Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser (1981) provide a
good starting point in this literature.

319

320

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

MARCH 2000

We design a series of seven distinct, controlled experiments (treatments) that permit us
to examine the above-stated conjectures. In
each treatment, subjects are presented with one
object, followed by a second one. The subject is
asked to “imagine that [she] received the object
as a gift from someone.” She subsequently indicates either her valuation of the gift (V), or
her cost estimate of the gift (C), or both. In
order to compare Waldfogel’s study with that of
SH, the value question appeared either in the
indifference version (V i ) or the equally happy
version (V h ). Following Waldfogel and SH, the
three questions were written as follows:2
(V i ) “Aside from any sentimental value of
the gift, indicate an amount in shekels which
would cause you to be indifferent between receiving the gift and receiving the cash.”
(V h ) “Aside from any sentimental value of
the gift, if, without the giver ever knowing, you
could receive an amount of money instead of
the gift, what is the minimum amount of money
that would make you equally happy? Indicate an
amount in shekels.”
(C) “In your opinion, how much money did
the giver pay for the gift? Indicate an amount in
shekels.”
Allowing for reversal of the order in which
the value and cost questions appear, the seven
treatments can be summarized as: V i C, CV i ,
V h C, CV h , V i , V h , and C.
Each subject remained in the same treatment
for both objects, that is, answered the same
question or pair of questions for both objects.
For the two objects we chose a practical one and
a decorative one. We sought objects that would
have a broad appeal and which were not gender
biased. One object was an attractive table lamp

with a gold base and a glass, emerald-green
shade in the shape of a half cylinder (retail
price: 159 shekels, ⫽ $45 USD at the time the
experiments were conducted). The other object
was a brown, hand-carved, African wooden
mask of dimensions 1 meter ⫻ 50 cm, purchased in Israel (retail price: 800 shekels, ⫽
$227 USD). The order in which the objects
were presented was balanced across subjects so
that roughly half saw the lamp first, and the
other half saw the mask first.3
The usefulness of these experiments is that
they allow us to discern whether the form of the
value question matters by comparing V i with
V h . We can also test for order effects by comparing V i C with CV i and V h C with CV h , and
whether estimates alone (V i , V h , C) differ from
those when paired with another question (treatments V i C, CV i , V h C, CV h ).
It is worth emphasizing that we are not interested in the welfare gain or loss of any individual treatment.4 All of our hypotheses involve
value or cost comparisons across treatments.
Finally, we come to SH’s claim that a more
representative subject pool accounts for their
reversal of Waldfogel’s deadweight loss finding. This is easily testable within the framework
of our design. We recruited an approximately
equal number of economists and noneconomists
and divided both groups between all seven treatments and the two object orderings in roughly
equal fractions.
Our sample consists of 414 subjects. 240
subjects were undergraduate students enrolled
in psychology classes majoring in either behavioral sciences or human resources (henceforth
referred to as psychologists for the sake of brevity). The remaining 174 students were undergraduate economics majors at Ben Gurion
University. For comparability with Waldfogel’s

2
The actual questionnaires administered to subjects
were translated to Hebrew. In an effort to ensure that the
meaning and undercurrents of the original surveys remained
intact, we employed the double-translation method in which
one person translates from the original to Hebrew and
another, unfamiliar with the original, from Hebrew to English. We used both economists and noneconomists for this
task. Like its English equivalent, the Hebrew word for
“indifferent,” “adeesh,” has several dictionary meanings,
the two most important of which for the purposes of this
study are: “showing no preference” and “unconcerned or
having no interest or feeling.”

3
Note that the element of Christmas is absent from our
experimental design. While there may indeed be something
unique concerning the welfare of gift-giving at Christmas
compared to other holidays and occasions, the more significant distinction is between modern gift-giving which serves
a primarily social function and gift-giving in primitive societies in which gifts served as a prelude to trade, a form of
insurance and a form of lending.
4
Given the fact that the lamp and the mask are “imposed
gifts,” not chosen with the recipient in mind (and not
actually given), we expect estimated costs to exceed substantially valuations.

I. Experimental Design
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TABLE 1—REGRESSION RESULTS
Dependent
variable
Lamp Value
(LV)
log(LV pair )

Mask Value
(MV)
log(MV pair )

Lamp Cost
(LC)
log(LC pair )

Mask Cost
(MC)
log(MC pair )

Constant Female

Psych

Lamp
first

Value
alone

Cost
alone

Cost
first

Vh

111.62
6.79
7.58 22.58 19.64
(0.008) (0.606) (0.570) (0.079) (0.134)
0.038
0.068 0.016 0.014
(0.856) (0.155) (0.744) (0.765)

59.31
(0.000)
0.006 0.197
(0.893) (0.000)

176.41
51.04 40.66 32.99 42.10
(0.193) (0.235) (0.352) (0.435) (0.326)
0.020
0.045 0.089 0.003
(0.918) (0.352) (0.083) (0.952)

119.75
(0.003)
0.066 0.154
(0.150) (0.001)

94.33
10.25 38.32
7.62
(0.013) (0.414) (0.003) (0.543)
1.46
0.017 0.084 0.025
(0.000) (0.621) (0.016) (0.446)

22.72
(0.123)

46.59
40.11 232.52
1.69
(0.789) (0.485) (0.000) (0.976)
1.23
0.015 0.150 0.002
(0.000) (0.663) (0.000) (0.960)

89.27
(0.191)

0.014 0.076
(0.661) (0.021)

0.021 0.034
(0.530) (0.318)

log(V pair )

.379
(.000)

.485
(.000)

log(C pair )

R 2

N

N.B. outliers
excluded

0.068 345

8

0.834 0.382 230
(0.000)

5

0.024 346

7

0.912 0.486 228
(0.000)

7

0.026 288

8

0.320 231

4

0.050 290

6

0.496 228

7

Notes: Estimated OLS regression coefficients with p-values in parentheses. The dependent variables lamp and mask value
(LV and MV), lamp and mask cost (LC and MC) are expressed as a function of subject gender, major, object presentation
order, and treatment dummies (whether the value or cost question was paired or asked alone and, in the case of pairing,
whether the cost question appeared first or second, and the version of the value question asked). The first regression in each
pair uses the data from all seven treatments. In the second regression of each pair, observations from those three treatments
in which the value or cost question appeared alone are dropped. Thus, the logged versions of the within-subject estimates of
value and cost from those treatments in which these questions appear together are used.

study, we chose economics students currently
enrolled in intermediate microeconomics
classes or in an economic history class for
which intermediate micro is a prerequisite.
II. Findings

Table 1 reports the results of OLS regressions.5 For each dependent variable, lamp value
(LV), mask value (MV), lamp cost (LC), and
mask cost (MC), there are a pair of regressions.
The first regression in each of the four pairs uses
all the data and thus permits us to estimate the
5
To deal with the problem of outliers, we eliminate
observations whose studentized residual is three or more
standard deviations away from the mean. For each observation, a regression is estimated based on all other N ⫺ 1
observations. The difference between the predicted dependent variable and its actual value is the predicted residual.
Dividing by its standard error yields the studentized residual. (See David Belsley et al. [1980] for a detailed explanation of this outlier procedure.)

influence of asking value and cost questions
alone versus pairing them. The dummy variable
“Value alone” (“Cost alone”) equals one for
treatments in which the value (cost) question is
asked alone, and zero when paired. The second
regression in each pair appears in double-log
specification.6 It focuses on those treatments in
which the cost and value questions are paired
(treatments V i C, CV i , V h C, CV h ). Thus, for
value estimates (LV, MV), we exclude treatments V i and V h . For cost estimates we exclude
the lone treatment in which cost appears alone
(treatment C). In this way, we are able to measure the impact of the ordering of the value and
cost questions on subjects’ estimates. The treatment variable “Cost first” assumes a value of
zero when value appears before cost (treatments
6
The double-log specification describes the relationship
between Value and Cost better than linearity in these variables. The coefficients on the log-independent variables can
be interpreted as elasticities.
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V i C and V h C), and a value of one when the
reverse holds (treatments CV i and CV h ).
The treatment dummy V h assumes a “0”
value for treatments in which the indifference
version of the value question was asked and a
“1” value when the equally happy version was
used. The coefficients of this variable in all four
of the value regressions point decisively to the
paper’s main result.
OBSERVATION 1: Valuations given in response to the equally happy question are much
higher than those given in the indifference version, whereas cost estimates are invariant to the
version of the value question with which they
are paired. Taken together, these findings indicate that the welfare yield from the equally
happy treatments is markedly higher than that
from the indifference treatments.
The mean valuation for the lamp given for
the equally happy formulation was 165 shekels, median ⫽ 150, more than 50 percent
higher than valuations elicited from the indifference version, mean 105, median ⫽ 100.
Similarly, the mask elicited a mean valuation
of 445 shekels, median ⫽ 300, in the equally
happy treatments compared to a mean of only
324, median ⫽ 200, in the indifference treatments. t-tests of means and the regression
coefficients (Table 1) indicate that all of these
differences are significant beyond the 0.1percent level.
The dummy variable “psych” takes on a “0”
value for economists and a “1” for psychologists and brings us the second result.
OBSERVATION 2: There is no significant difference between the valuations of economists
and psychologists. On the other hand, psychologists give higher cost estimates than economists indicating that gifts to economists provide
a higher welfare yield than gifts to psychologists.
Psychologists and economists gave identical
value estimates for the lamp, mean values of
135 shekels. For the mask, psychologists’ mean
valuation was 402 compared to a mean valuation of 360 by economists. Both the “psych”
coefficient for the MV regression ( p-value ⫽
0.35) and a t-test of means ( p-value ⫽ 0.30)

MARCH 2000

reveal that this difference is not significant.7
Psychologists’ cost estimates, on the other
hand, were substantially higher than those of
economists for both the lamp and the mask.
According to Waldfogel’s measure of welfare,
this implies that gifts to economists actually
have a higher welfare yield than those to psychologists, contrary to SH’s claim.8 The psychologists indicated cost estimates for the lamp
35 shekels or 24 percent greater than those
obtained from the economists ( p-value ⫽ 0.01
in t-test). The magnitude of this finding increases for the mask: psychologists gave average cost estimates of 603 shekels compared to
economists’ average of 375 shekels. The difference of 228 shekels or 61 percent is significant
beyond the 0.1-percent level.
OBSERVATION 3: Whether cost or value estimates are elicited first does not affect the
estimates themselves. However, value estimates
alone are weakly greater than when paired with
cost estimates; and cost estimates alone are
weakly less than when paired with value estimates.
This last point should not be overstated as the
results are not strongly significant ( p-values
from the four “Value alone” and “Cost alone”
regression coefficients range from 0.12 to 0.33).
Nonetheless, they do suggest that welfare estimates may increase when estimates of value and
cost are temporally separated. Asking about
cost and value together may undermine value by

7
The reversal in the sign of the regression coefficient for
“psych” from LV to LV pair and from MV to MV pair reflects
a tendency among psychologists only to indicate higher
valuations when the value question appears alone (psychologists’ mean values for value alone treatments are 164 and
429 for the lamp and mask, respectively) than when it is
paired with the cost question (psychologists’ mean valuations for such paired treatments are 131 and 380 for the
lamp and mask, respectively). An interaction dummy variable composed of “psych” and “Value alone”, and a t-test of
means for the mask show this tendency is not statistically
significant. A t-test of means for the lamp, however, rejects
the equality of means at the 6-percent level.
8
Of course, Waldfogel uses recipients’ cost estimates in
his definition of welfare because he cannot obtain actual
costs. When available, value estimates minus actual costs
form the more natural measure of welfare yield. This is not
to exclude the possibility that the recipient’s perception of a
gift’s cost may influence her valuation of the gift.
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changing the judgmental frame of reference
from a holistic assessment that includes nonmaterial aspects to a colder, more calculating, materially bound assessment. As footnote 7
suggests, different subject pools may be more or
less susceptible to this effect.
With one exception, the order in which the
lamp and the mask were presented to subjects
does not affect their value and cost estimates:
lamp value estimates appear sensitive to the
order of presentation. The coefficient of 22.58
on “Lamp first” ( p-value ⫽ 0.08) indicates that
lamp value estimates increase when the lamp is
shown after the more expensive mask. Higher
value estimates on the mask provide an anchor
or point of reference from which subsequent
lamp value judgments are made.
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“Equally happy” probably puts respondents
in a more cheerful or optimistic frame of mind
compared to the cold, sterile term “indifferent.”
The word “happy” may prime or automatically
activate a set of positive emotions which are
subsequently applied to the gift value assessments. This priming of emotions occurs unbeknownst to the respondent and in spite of
explicit instructions to exclude emotions.10 On
the other hand, our experiments support SH’s
critique that “indifferent” is a technical term
natural to economists but unfamiliar to noneconomists. Among the 99 psychology students
who responded to the indifference version of the
value question, 10 raised their hands to ask
about the meaning of the word.
IV. Concluding Remarks

III. Discussion

Is gift-giving a source of deadweight loss?
Our results indicate that it depends critically on
how you ask the question and, to a lesser degree, on whom you ask.9 That economists offer
lower cost estimates and therefore have a
greater welfare yield for gifts than psychologists
contradicts SH’s claim. This finding suggests
that an expensive gift given to signal wealth or
intent may not be adequately appreciated by an
economist.
However, the paper’s most significant result
is that the form of the value question dramatically affects the apparent welfare yield of gifts.
That subtle changes in wording can drastically
affect subject response has been established in a
vast array of domains, including individual
choice problems and preference reversals, experimental bargaining games, and the valuation
of public goods using contingent valuation survey methods. Particularly in written surveys, in
which written words are the only inputs available to respondents (as opposed to face-to-face
or telephone surveys in which visual or oral
prompts may be used), wording takes on a disproportionate importance.

While this paper ostensibly concerns the welfare implications of gift-giving, it more directly
addresses survey and experimental methodology. Two methodological points are in order.
First, Vernon L. Smith (1994) lists seven reasons to conduct an experiment. The experiments
reported in this paper establish an eighth reason:
to evaluate the content and robustness of one or
more field studies. Just as the experimental laboratory can be used to discriminate between
competing theories (number one on Smith’s
list), the crucial elements of conflicting field
studies may be brought under the control of the
experimenter to determine what underlies the
results.11
Second, our results suggest that individuals
do not always carry around with them readily
accessible, preformulated valuations of objects.
Instead these assessments are often first formulated upon request and thereby sensitive to a
number of methodological considerations including context, the precise wording of respondents’ instructions and the order and timing of
events. This is particularly true in environments
in which considerations other than strategy,
such as emotions and fairness, may influence

9
Our results support John A. List and Jason F. Shogren’s
(1998) intuition that “sample selection may not be the
pivotal issue in this debate.” They produce their own estimate of the welfare yield of gifts using a random nth price
auction in which subjects indicate the prices at which they
are willing to sell individual gifts received for Christmas.

10
See John Bargh (1988) for a further discussion of the
cognitive process underlying the unconscious priming of
emotions.
11
Some of these issues are considered in the unpublished
version of this comment which is available for download at
Ruffle’s website: http://econ.bgu.ac.il/faculty/bradley.
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behavior. Future efforts into the welfare implications of gift-giving should therefore bear in
mind these methodological issues in designing
their data collection methods. Other issues not
closely examined herein include the type of gift
given, the validity of excluding sentimental
value, and the representativeness of the respondents, particularly along the dimensions of culture and age. Finally, although hypothetical
gifts may provide greater experimental control,
one should be aware of the possible differences
between real and hypothetical gifts when estimating the welfare yield of gifts.
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